

UNCLASSIFIED

G30

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 PARIS 12943 101403Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00
	DODE-00	EB-01	EUR-01	OIGO-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-16	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	PA-01
	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/051W			

-----453422 101408Z /38

O 101339Z MAY 94
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4503

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS 12943

DEPARTMENT FOR HA A/S SHATTUCK AND AF/C FROM RAWSON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, FR, RW
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH GEN. DALLAIRE ON A
- CEASE-FIRE IN RWANDA, MAY 8

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. GENERAL DALLAIRE RETURNED MY CALL TO HIM SUNDAY, MAY 8 AROUND 10 PM. HE HAD RECEIVED FROM HIS AIDE A SUMMARY OF YOUR CALL THE DAY BEFORE BUT WAS NOT SURE OF THE CONTEXT OR THE TIMING OF THE CONTACTS YOU HAD DESCRIBED.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 PARIS 12943 101403Z
3. I REVIEWED FOR THE GENERAL THE BACKGROUND OF OUR DEMARCHE TO RPF SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION, NOTING THE CONSENSUS AMONG REGIONAL LEADERS THAT AN APPROPRIATE FOLLOW UP TO THE ARUSHA DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE CEASE-FIRE TALKS AT THE FIELD COMMANDER LEVEL. I TOLD DALLAIRE THAT WE HAD RECEIVED FORMAL ASSURANCE FROM BOTH RPF AND THE GOR THAT THEY AGREED WITH SUCH AN APPROACH.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4. DALLAIRE SAID THAT FIELD COMMANDERS FELT OUT OF SYNC WITH THEIR POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. KAGAME COMPLAINED THAT PEOPLE WERE RUSHING AROUND SIGNING COMMITMENTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT EVER CLUING HIM INTO WHAT THOSE DOCUMENTS SAID. DALLAIRE HAD HIMSELF NO RECORD OF THE GBADOLITE DOCUMENTS OR THE "UNSIGNED" AGREEMENT FROM ARUSHA. HE HAD, NONETHELESS, PROPOSED TO BOTH SIDES THAT HIS STAFF WORK OUT OPERATIONAL MODALITIES FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN A DOCUMENT AND PRESENT THAT TO BOTH SIDES TO SEE IF ITS PROVISIONS WERE PRACTICAL. AFTER RESPECTIVE STAFFS HAD REVIEWED OR AMENDED THE DOCUMENT, HE WOULD TRY TO CONVENE FIELD COMMANDERS TOGETHER TO REVIEW AND ACCEPT THE DOCUMENT. USING THIS APPROACH, HE MIGHT HAVE AGREEMENT ON CEASE-FIRE MODALITIES BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

5. DALLAIRE SAID THE COMMANDERS WOULD NEED APPROVAL FROM POLITICAL AUTHORITIES TO GO ALONG WITH THIS APPROACH. I TOLD DALLAIRE THAT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES ON BOTH SIDES HAD ASSURED US THEY FAVORED CEASE-FIRE TALKS IN THE FIELD. IF POLITICAL OBJECTIONS WERE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 PARIS 12943 101403Z
RAISED TO WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO, WE WOULD GET BACK TO THOSE AUTHORITIES AND PRESS HARD FOR ACCEPTANCE. FROM WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCHES, HE HAD A GREEN LIGHT TO PRESS FORWARD SWIFTLY IN WORKING OUT CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS.

6. DALLAIRE CONCLUDED OUR CONVERSATION WITH A PLEA FOR SUPPORT ON ENHANCING HIS FORCES. "IF WE DON'T GET TROOPS HERE WITH SOME BETTER EQUIPMENT, THERE IS LITTLE I CAN DO TO TURN THIS SITUATION AROUND," HE ARGUED. I TOLD DALLAIRE THAT WE FAVORED AN ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL FORCE BUT QUESTION ABOUT ITS PURPOSE, SIZE AND MANDATE WERE STILL BEING DISCUSSED.

7. DALLAIRE SAID, WITHOUT ELABORATING, THAT IT HAD BEEN A TOUGH DAY. HE SEEMED, NONETHELESS, IN GOOD SPIRITS, JOKING AND UPBEAT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING WITH STAFFS ON BOTH SIDES TO SET UP CEASE-FIRE MODALITIES.

HARRIMAN

UNCLASSIFIED